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Re-envisioning a Caitanya Vaiṣṇava ‘Perfect Being 
Theology’ and Demonstrating Its Theodical Implications 
via the ‘Goodness Criterion’ 
 
By Akshay Gupta 
 
Abstract: Popular imaginations and receptions 
of Hinduism often neglect to consider its 
theological dimensions that conceive of the 
divine reality along conceptual pathways 
analogous to those of the major Judeo-Christian 
religious traditions. Thus, within Western 
scholarship, there have been no systematic 
attempts to delineate central doxastic elements 
within the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition by 
suggesting correlations with distinctive 
Christian concepts, and this scholarly lacuna 
within Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism restricts 
comparative theological dialogue between 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity. In order 
to address this lacuna, I demonstrate that 
aspects of Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism’s theological 
framework can be conceptualized in 
conversation with their Christian counterparts.  
 
BY illustrating certain parities between the 
theological frameworks of Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism 
and Christianity, I also aim to pave the way for 
further comparative theological dialogue 
between these two religious traditions. In 
particular, I propose that Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism’s 
theological framework enables the tradition to 
become a suitable dialogical partner to 
Christianity in comparative theodicy. I also 
suggest and put into practice a criterion that can 
be helpful for refining the comparative 
theodical exchanges between Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity.  
 
Introduction 
That Hindu religious traditions contain 
monotheistic strands is often overlooked by 
those who are not acquainted with the breadth 
of religious expression that is witnessed within 
the diverse matrices of Hindu religious life. 
However, as Ankur Barua notes,1 Hindu 
theological frameworks that conceptualize the 
divine reality as a supremely powerful personal 
being who generates and sustains cosmic and 
transcosmic realms have recently begun to 
receive greater scholarly attention.2 One Hindu 
devotional tradition that conceives of the 
supremely powerful personal God is the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava3 tradition, which was 
founded by Caitanya (1486-1534 CE) and has 
Kṛṣṇa-bhakti, or devotion to Kṛṣṇa, as its 
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doctrinal and experiential pivot. However, 
despite the increasing scholarship on the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition,4 scholars are yet to 
comprehensively define central doxastic 
components of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition 
through active conversations with their 
Christian analogs, thus limiting the scope for 
comparative theological dialogue between these 
two religious traditions. Therefore, I will begin 
to address this lacuna by drawing some 
conceptual parallels between the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava theological framework and perfect 
being theology, which most Christian traditions 
adhere to. I acknowledge that comparative 
theology does not entail the mere recognition of 
one religious tradition’s doctrinal tenets within 
another religious tradition’s theological 
framework; however, I argue that formulating 
the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition’s doctrinal 
tenets by creatively and sensitively employing 
Christian terminology can enhance the 
hermeneutical potential of comparative 
theological exchanges between Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavas and Christians. In particular, I will 
discuss the comparative theodical implications 
of recognizing the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition’s 
adherence to perfect being theology.  
 
Examining God’s Triune Divine Attributes in the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava Tradition  
In this article, I first aim to illuminate the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition’s theological 
framework by suggesting certain analogies with 
distinctive Judeo-Christian theological motifs. 
Christianity, as well as the other Judeo-Christian 
religions, adhere to a theological framework 
known as ‘perfect being’ theology, according to 
which God is characterized as the greatest 
possible being who exhibits maximal 
perfection.5 Perfect being theology also 
conceptualizes God as a ‘triple-O’ personal God, 
which indicates that God, the supremely 
personal being, is omnipotent (all-powerful), 
omnibenevolent (all-good), and omniscient (all-
knowing).6 Although perfect being theology is 
generally associated with the Judeo-Christian 
religious traditions, I argue that it is not limited 
to them and can also be found within certain 
Indic religious traditions. For instance, as I will 
now demonstrate, the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava 
theological framework can be best categorized 
as a perfect being theology. 
Since it is well established that the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition views God as the supreme 
person,7 I will not defend this particular claim in 
great depth. Instead, drawing from a) the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava theologian A.C. 
Bhaktivedānta Swami Prabhupāda’s (1896-1977 
CE) exegeses on the Bhagavata Purāṇa (c. 9th 
century CE) (henceforth BhP),8 a foundational 
text for the Kṛṣṇa-bhakti traditions, as well as b) 
the BhP itself, I will locate the theological views 
that explicitly state God’s possession of the 
triune divine omni-attributes.  
The first divine attribute that I will examine 
is God’s omnibenevolence. Prabhupāda is 
particularly explicit about his belief that Kṛṣṇa 
is the omnibenevolent God in his commentary 
on verse BhP 10.10.40, where he succinctly 
writes, “Kṛṣṇa, God, is all-good.”9 The BhP itself 
also describes the omnibenevolence of Kṛṣṇa. 
Thus, BhP 8.3.1710 states that God is bhūri-karuṇa, 
meaning the one whose compassion (karuṇa) is 
superabundant or great (bhūri). Prabhupāda 
translates bhūri-karuṇa as “unlimitedly 
merciful” further reinforcing his view of God’s 
omnibenevolence.11   
BhP 10.87.2212 describes God as a benefactor 
(hita), dear (priya), and the very self (ātman) for 
a living being, and BhP 7.1.113 adds that God is a 
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self’s well-wisher (suhṛt) and is equal to all living 
beings (sama). I argue that this equality should 
be understood not in terms of an ontological 
parity between the human self and the divine 
self but in the light of Bhagavad Gītā14 
(henceforth BhG) 4.11:15 “I share my love with 
individuals in the same manner as how they 
submit themselves to me. Humans follow my 
path universally, O Pārtha.” Therefore, Kṛṣṇa’s 
equal treatment of all living beings indicates 
that he reciprocates their love according to how 
they approach him (this motif is also reiterated 
in BhP 10.32.20-2216).  
However, one may note, as Barua does,17 
that if God merely responds to the actions of the 
devotees, there can be no unmerited, free-
flowing acts of grace performed by God. In 
response to this, I argue that 1) there is an 
element of grace present within God’s reciprocal 
exchanges with the devotees, and this is because 
God gives the devotee more than what they 
deserve in God’s reciprocal exchanges with 
them. The BhP also indicates that the actions of 
Kṛṣṇa-bhakti are in a different ontological 
category than ordinary actions, and thus the 
actions of Kṛṣṇa-bhakti are not structured by the 
same proportionality principle that karmic 
mechanisms putatively possess. For instance, 
BhP 10.80-8118 explains that Kṛṣṇa gave one of 
his devotees named Sūdamā unimaginable 
riches simply because Sūdamā gave Kṛṣṇa a few 
morsels of rice, BhP 10.81.3519 states that Kṛṣṇa 
magnifies the importance of whatever his 
devotees offer him, and BhP 1.2.1520 states that 
the actions of Kṛṣṇa-bhakti, such as 
remembrance of God, can destroy one’s karmic 
residues.  
I also argue that 2) there is an element of 
grace through God’s voluntary descent to this 
world as an avatāra (literally ‘one who crosses 
down’). God’s voluntary descent into this world, 
or the doctrine of the avatāra, is described by the 
BhP, although the earliest formulation of it is 
found in BhG 4.5-9.21 A broad Christian 
equivalent of this theme would be the doctrine 
of incarnation, though a distinction needs to be 
carefully made between the terms ‘incarnation’ 
and ‘avatāra.’ Whereas the incarnation of God in 
Christ takes place only once, the avatāras of the 
divine reality repeatedly descend to this world 
across different cosmological cycles (yugas).22 
Moreover, while the doctrine of the incarnation 
asserts that God descends to this world at one 
specific historical conjuncture and becomes 
physically embodied in a particular human 
individual called Jesus of Nazareth, the avatāra 
doctrine, as conceived by Caitanya Vaiṣṇava 
theologians such as Prabhupāda, asserts that 
God descends to multiple transcosmic, 
macrocosmic, and microcosmic planes in a non-
physical, supramundane body that is unlike 
ours.23 Barbara Holdrege therefore states that 
the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava traditions holds that 
Kṛṣṇa, as the avatārin (the source of all the 
avatāras) is able to produce multiple embodied 
forms by which he can manifest his divine 
presence for specific cosmological purposes, 
whilst maintaining his divine personhood (each 
avatāra is not an ontologically distinct person 
from Kṛṣṇa) and preserving the cosmic prowess 
of his original supramundane body.24  
The BhP states that God descends to our 
world in order to facilitate our soteriological 
progress. Verse 1.8.3525 explains that one of 
God’s motives for descending is to prepare 
instances that would facilitate our hearing, 
remembrance, and worship of God as we are 
individuals who are afflicted in the world by 
ignorance, desire, and karman. This is significant 
because Hindu devotional traditions centered 
3
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on devotion to Kṛṣṇa (such as the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition) believe that selves can 
gradually become emancipated from this 
physical world and return to God through the 
performance of bhakti or devotion, which 
centers extensively around the remembrance of 
Kṛṣṇa’s activities and wondrous līlā.26 This 
salvific component of God’s descent to this 
world thus illustrates God’s compassionate 
longing to have us return to God and escape our 
worldly sufferings. God’s descent as an avatāra 
also signifies that God graciously intervenes in 
our world so that selves can further their 
soteriological process.  
Prabhupāda also asserts his belief that God 
possesses the divine attribute of omnipotence. 
For instance, in his commentary on BhP 6.8.32-
33, he succinctly writes, “the Lord is 
omnipotent.”27 Establishing the centrality of the 
motif of God’s omnipotence in the BhP is quite 
straightforward. For example, verse 8.3.1928 
describes God as ananta-śakti, or the one whose 
power is unlimited, and verse 10.3.1729 states 
that God is sarvātma, or the one whose self is 
everything. Furthermore, several verses 
throughout the BhP such as 10.3.1930 assert that 
the creation, the maintenance, and the 
destruction of this world occur because of God, 
thus indicating God’s complete sovereignty over 
the world.  
Lastly, I wish to demonstrate that God 
possesses omniscience as a divine attribute 
within the theological frameworks of the BhP 
and the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. 
Prabhupāda explicitly asserts the view that God 
is omniscient in his commentary on BhP 6.8.32-
33,31 and verse 6.8.3332 itself also describes God 
as omniscient (sarva-jña).  
Thus, as we can see, God is viewed as the 
perfect being within the theological frameworks 
of the BhP and the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition’s 
important theologians such as Prabhupāda. The 
tradition’s adherence to perfect being theology 
is significant for the purposes of comparative 
theology because it situates Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavism and the Judeo-Christian religions on 
a similar theological spectrum. One implication 
of this conceptual resonance is that one of the 
biggest challenges to Christian theism, the 
problem of evil, which presupposes perfect 
being theology, pertains to the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition as well. Thus, the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition can act as a dialogical partner 
with Christianity in what Francis Clooney has 
termed ‘comparative theodicy,’ which he 
describes as “the construction of a broad, cross-
cultural and cross-religious set of theodicies 
that support and refine one another on the one 
hand, and, on the other, reveal and deconstruct 
unquestioned sets of presuppositions about evil 
and what counts in explanations of it.”33 This 
indicates that the theodical resources that 
Christianity or Christian philosophers have 
developed in response to the problem of evil, 
such as ‘Skeptical Theism’ or Alvin Plantinga’s 
‘Free Will Defense’ can also be hermeneutically 
reconfigured by the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition 
in order to bolster its own response to the 
problem of evil. Conversely, the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition’s theodical responses, which 
I am developing in other academic projects, can 
also be utilized by the Judeo-Christian religious 
traditions so that these traditions can mutually 
reinforce their own theodicies. Within the 
doctrinal milieus of comparative theodicy, 
theologians from both Christianity and Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavism can also better understand their 
own theodicy’s conceptual flaws by reference to 
the theodical framework of the dialogical other, 
and thus, each religious tradition can work to 
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refine, rework, and strengthen their respective 
theodical response. 
 
The ‘Goodness Criterion’  
Although it is beyond the scope of this 
article to provide an extensive theodical 
comparison between the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava 
tradition and a particular Christian tradition, I 
can briefly highlight some comparative 
theodical dimensions that can open up when it 
is established that the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava 
tradition adheres to perfect being theology. In 
order to refine the process of comparative 
theodicy, I propose the following criterion for 
cross evaluating the conceptual strength of two 
theodicies, and I define this criterion as the 
‘goodness criterion.’  
If God’s goodness is shown to be greater in 
theodicy A than in theodicy B, then I propose 
that theodicy A is a stronger theodicy than 
theodicy B, all else being equal. For instance, 
according to this criterion, a theodicy without 
gratuitous suffering would be stronger than a 
theodicy with gratuitous suffering, given that 
God’s goodness is maximized if God doesn’t 
cause creatures to suffer unnecessarily and 
instead ensures that every instance of suffering 
ultimately serves a beneficial purpose. The 
goodness criterion challenges the theodicist to 
go one step farther than merely addressing the 
problem of evil. If the theodicist wishes to 
participate in comparative theodicy, they are 
also challenged to demonstrate how their 
theodicy is stronger than competing theodicies 
or how their theodicy has certain features that 
are conducive to the construction of a stronger 
theodicy. My reasoning for this claim is as 
follows.  
If a theodicy A presupposes that God is all-
good, then it must be able to illustrate that there 
is no other conceivable theodicy B in which 
God’s goodness is greater. Otherwise, the 
goodness of God in theodicy A is inferior to that 
of God in theodicy B, and if the 
conceptualization of God in theodicy A is less 
good than another conceptualization of God, 
then theodicy A fails to satisfy the premise that 
God is the most benevolent being conceivable.  
My argument can be laid out as follows:  
1. A triple-O God is not only 
omnibenevolent but is also the most 
benevolent being in existence as well as 
the most benevolent being that can be 
conceived.  
2. A being that possesses the most 
goodness must be more benevolent than 
any other being.  
Conclusion: Therefore, if a theodicist is 
going to assert the existence of a triple-O God, 
they must be prepared to show that there is no 
conceptualization of God with greater goodness 
than one’s own; otherwise, this alternative 
conception of God with greater conceivable 
goodness implies that the theodicist conceives 
of God as being non-maximally good.  
By employing the goodness criterion in 
comparative theodical exercises, theodicists can 
evaluate and refine the strength of their 
theodicy vis-à-vis engagement with other 
theodicies, resulting in illuminating theodical 
dialogue between both parties. I will 
demonstrate one instance of such dialogue by 
placing the Caitanya tradition and Christianity 
in active comparative theodical conversation 
with one another by using their notions of post-
mortem existence as the locus of comparative 
theodical inquiry. The Caitanya tradition holds 
that following the death of their physical body, 
finite selves, who are immaterial and 
ontologically distinct from their physical body, 
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transmigrate into another physical body.34 
Moreover, selves do not begin each life as a 
tabula rasa but can instead continue to make 
moral and soteriological progress in each 
successive lifetime.35 Thus, as selves continue to 
transmigrate across various physical bodies, 
they can gradually develop greater moral 
character and spiritual purity, enabling them to 
one day attain soteriological perfection as a 
result of this cumulative spiritual advancement. 
According to Prabhupāda, God is also willing to 
take all selves back into his company, thus 
suggesting a vision of universal salvation.36  
In contrast, many, though not all, Christian 
traditions hold that selves possess only one life 
in which they can attain soteriological 
perfection.37 Many Christian traditions also hold 
that selves are eternally damned if they fail to 
attain salvation through Christ in this one life, 
although there are some Christian thinkers that 
believe in universal salvation.38 Thus, according 
to the Christian traditions that believe in a one-
life modality of existence paired with eternal 
damnation, there is no opportunity for selves to 
continue to make soteriological progress across 
multiple lives. They must instead attain 
salvation in this very life or face eternal 
damnation.  
One Christian philosopher who has 
defended the co-existence of a triple-O God and 
a one life modality of existence paired with 
eternal damnation is Jerry Walls. Walls argues 
that because selves possess libertarian free will, 
God cannot compel or force them to accept God, 
and therefore, selves are free to reject God and 
any opportunity given to them for salvation.39 
He also argues that certain individuals choose to 
embrace evil wholeheartedly and consequently 
continue to reject God eternally.40 In Walls’s 
eschatological framework, selves exercise their 
volitional capacities in going either to heaven or 
to hell after their earthly existence. Thus, even 
though Walls’ conceptual framework has a post-
mortem existence, selves cannot become 
embodied as humans working towards their 
own salvation on earth again.41  
Even in the light of Walls’s argumentation, I 
argue that a Caitanya Vaiṣṇava post-mortem 
framework has greater theodical strength than 
one life modality existence paired with eternal 
damnation. I accept the notion that God cannot 
force the self to embrace God. However, it does 
not follow that this constraint causes certain 
selves to be eternally damned. In order to 
substantiate his argument for eternal 
damnation, Walls must assume that these selves 
in hell are causally determined to never want to 
leave hell. As Thomas Talbott points out, 
however, this assumption is inconsistent with 
the idea of libertarian free will to begin with.42 If 
the self is causally determined to choose a life of 
sin eternally, then it does not, in fact, have 
libertarian free will. I therefore reason that if a 
self is to possess libertarian free will, it must 
have the option to be able to choose God again, 
and the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava theological 
framework indeed provides selves with this 
opportunity by allowing them to be repeatedly 
reborn as humans who can work towards their 
liberation.  
Nevertheless, for argument’s sake, let us say 
that the circumstances of hell are such that the 
self could escape hell but volitionally does not 
choose to — a view that preserves libertarian 
free will. It is not clear to me how, according to 
the goodness criterion, Walls’s theological 
framework is more morally defensible than a 
theological framework that provides an 
individual with multiple subsequent human 
lives in which it can grow spiritually and acquire 
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another opportunity to embrace God. In a one-
life modality of existence, the selves who do not 
choose God are eternally condemned, even if 
this ‘condemnation’ is sustained by their own 
volitional choices. However, in the multiple-
lives modality of existence found within 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism, an individual who does 
not attain liberation in one life can get a chance 
to do so in a future life. Therefore, over time, 
each self will continue to receive further 
opportunities for salvation. Moreover, through 
the process of transmigration, selves gradually 
learn soteriologically beneficial lessons by 
which they can grow spiritually, so, even if 
selves fail to attain salvation in one life, they can 
continue their soteriological journey in their 
next life. Therefore, in such a conceptual 
framework, selves can progress in their spiritual 
journey from lifetime to lifetime until they 
finally attain liberation. Furthermore, since 
selves are not causally determined to reject God 
eternally43 and have their desires substantially 
reconfigured across time until they choose to 
make God the sole locus of their desires, there is 
always a possibility, even if it is slight, that the 
self can turn to God in any one of its lives. 
Although I have not come across any Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava theologian who has explicitly stated 
that all selves will return to God, I argue, based 
on my own reasoning, that given an infinite 
amount of time, which is present within 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism’s cosmological framework, 
any possibility, no matter how small, will be 
actualized. Since it is possible that selves can 
eventually turn to God within any one of their 
lives, I argue that all selves will eventually be 
liberated. Thus, I argue that within Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavism’s theological framework, God’s 
goodness is greater than in a one-life modality 
of existence that allows certain selves to 
experience eternal damnation, since in the 
former, all selves will eventually enjoy beatific 
intimacy with God.   
Therefore, while a Christian theodicist may 
be able to explain how a triple-O God can 
support a one life modality of existence paired 
with eternal damnation, they do not seem to be 
able to explain that this theological framework 
reinforces God’s goodness to a greater extent 
than a theological framework like that of the 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition. However, by 
engaging in comparative theodical dialogue 
with Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism, the Christian 
theodicist can interrogate their theological 
presuppositions more critically and refine their 
theodicy.  
Yet, the Christian theodicist is not the only 
party that can benefit from the abovementioned 
comparative theodical exchange — the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava theodicist can also learn from their 
Christian interlocuter. For instance, although 
the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava theodicist can defend 
God’s supreme goodness through an appeal to 
the putative existence of their multiple-lives 
framework, they may come to realize, through 
comparative theodical dialogue with the 
Christian theodicist, that a modality of existence 
in which finite selves have repeated chances to 
attain liberation can devalue the soteriological 
importance of any one given lifetime. In 
contrast, within Walls’s theological framework, 
selves, understanding that their salvation rests 
upon their decisions in this very lifetime, have a 
greater incentive to take their soteriological 
pursuits very seriously. Therefore, the Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava theodicist can understand the 
conceptual drawbacks of a multiple lives 
framework and work to bolster their theodicy by 
emphasizing the importance of one’s 
soteriological pursuits in this very lifetime. For 
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instance, they could highlight the notion that 
soteriological progress is best achieved while 
embodied as a human,44 and they could also 
draw attention to how rare it is for a self to 
acquire a human rebirth.45 By doing so, they can 
ascribe greater soteriological importance to 
one’s current life so that individuals do not 
become lethargic in their attempts for 
liberation. Yet, they can continue to uphold a 
multiple lives modality of existence so that their 
theological framework can support a vision of 
universal salvation.  
Finally, I acknowledge that someone may 
also view the goodness criterion as too 
simplistic. Admittedly, it can be difficult to 
employ the goodness criterion because it is not 
always possible to compare one facet of theodicy 
A to one facet of theodicy B while keeping 
everything else equal. For instance, there can be 
distinctive benefits to both a one life modality of 
existence and a multiple lives modality of 
existence. Thus, attempting to demonstrate that 
one is superior to the other can neglect the fact 
that they each have their own relative merits 
and drawbacks. Therefore, I acknowledge that 
the goodness criterion is not perfect. However, I 
argue that it can be a helpful tool for stimulating 
comparative theodicy conversations and can be 
one theoretical pathway by which theodicists 
can interrogate the presuppositions of another 
theodicist’s theological framework.  
Further suggestions for improving the 
quality of comparative theodical exchanges are 
beyond the scope of this article. However, by 
illustrating the Caitanya tradition’s adherence 
to a perfect being theology, I believe that I have 
demonstrated how the Caitanya tradition can be 
a comparative theodical dialogical partner to 
other religious traditions that too adhere to 
perfect being theology. Moreover, by proposing 
the goodness criterion, I hope that I have been 
able to contribute to an ongoing process of 
refining such comparative theodical exchanges.  
 
Conclusion 
Thus, I argue that the thematic parities 
between the theological frameworks of Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity that I have outlined 
can provide a stronger basis for both of these 
religious traditions to engage in mutually 
enriching discourses, particularly in the context 
of theological and philosophical inquiry that 
relates to perfect being theology, such as the 
problem of evil. I have also provided one 
criterion, namely, the ‘goodness criterion,’ 
which can be employed in order to facilitate 
comparative theodical exchanges between 
Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism and Christianity. Although 
the goodness criterion may have its own 
conceptual difficulties, I argue that it is 
nevertheless a steppingstone towards the 
refinement of comparative theodicy. Such 
refinement is not an overnight process and will 
require careful consideration by scholars. 
However, I hope that this article has brought us 
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